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WHO DISCOVERED THE WILL?

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1. Approaches to the Question

Many modern critics regard the concept of the will as an anachronism that ought to be excluded from our account of Greek philosophers. Ross remarks: 'It has often been complained that the psychology of Plato and Aristotle has no distinct conception of the will.'¹ Gauthier insists that 'in the psychology of Aristotle the will does not exist'.² According to MacIntyre, 'Aristotle, like every other ancient pre-Christian author, had no concept of the will and there is no conceptual space in his scheme for such an alien notion in the explanations of defect and error'.³ Different candidates have been proposed for the title of discoverer of the will. Sometimes the introduction of the will into accounts of choice and action is attributed to the Romans.⁴ Sometimes Augustine is regarded as the pioneer, under Hebraic and Christian influence.⁵ Sometimes the honour (if that is the right word) goes to Maximus the Confessor.⁶

A proper discussion of this question requires a wide-ranging historical and philosophical inquiry. It is particularly important to identify and to examine the relevant philosophical issues, if we are to see which questions need to be answered in deciding whether or not a philosopher has a concept or theory of the will.⁷ I do not intend to survey all the relevant evidence and issues. I will simply pick out some issues that are relevant to one dispute about the will.

Those who deny that Greek philosophers have any concept of the will recognize that Greek theories explain choice and action by reference to beliefs and desires. But they argue that the features ascribed to beliefs and desires in these theories fall short of the characteristic features of the will.⁸

Some Greek theories, and in particular the Socratic and Stoic theories, are intellectualist. According to an intellectualist view, all that affects our choice between doing A and doing B is our belief about whether A or B is, all things

considered, better. No non-cognitive element in the agent determines the choice between A and B. This does not mean that belief by itself moves us to action. An intellectualist might agree that a non-cognitive element is present, but deny that it makes a difference between one agent's choices and another's. This is the view Socrates seems to take in the *Hippias Minor* and *Euthydemus*. He assumes that we all have the fixed desire for our own happiness and differ only in our beliefs about what promotes happiness; we cannot reject this desire for happiness in favour of some other aim and we do not decide to pursue happiness in preference to something else.

Not all Greek theories claim that only ignorance can explain failure to choose the apparent good. Plato's and Aristotle's doctrine of the divided soul recognizes that both rational and non-rational desires influence action.⁹ They argue against Socrates that our doing or not doing what we believe to be best depends not only on our beliefs about the good, but also on the comparative strength of our desires; if we want the immediate satisfaction more strongly than we want our overall good, we choose the action promising the immediate satisfaction.

Both these views seem to treat agents as passive subjects of their desires, and in doing so they seem to leave out an important aspect of human agency. The intellectualist view recognizes one constant motivational force, our desire for the good; the anti-intellectualist view, recognizing conflicts of motives, allows other forces besides the desire for the good, but it treats the agent as a mere victim and spectator of possible conflicts. Both accounts seem to overlook our capacity to reflect on our desires and to choose between them. We are inclined to say that we need not simply contemplate our desires; if we reflect on them, we can decide whether or not to regard a desire as expressing our will, and we can act accordingly.

If we must recognize this reflective decision between desires, then, it seems, we must recognize the will as a third element in rational choice besides mere belief and mere desire. If we recognize this third element, we will readily infer that it must be important, even decisive, in character, virtue, and vice; for our actions, plans, and effective preferences will reflect not our mere desire, but the results of our reflexions on these desires and our choices about which desires to follow.

This conception of the will and its moral importance is prominent in the moral psychology of St Augustine. Rejecting the view that we are passive in relation to our choices, he identifies the will with the unforced movement of the mind towards getting or keeping something.¹⁰ Our consciousness of our will is inseparable from consciousness of ourselves, and we attribute an action to ourselves precisely in so far as we attribute it to our will.¹¹ The will, rather than any external influence or internal force, is both the cause of our being subject to sin and the cause of our turning towards virtue.¹² It

determines whether our passions are good or bad; indeed, when the will is good, the passions themselves are expressions of the good will.¹³

Virtue, as Augustine conceives it, is precisely the good use of free choice.¹⁴ The overriding direction of people's will is expressed in their love,¹⁵ and virtue is the proper ordering or direction of people's love.¹⁶ If the will correctly aims at the right ultimate end, and the expressions of will towards the means are rightly connected with it, then the agent is virtuous.¹⁷ The will orders and directs not only our desires, but also our perceptions, memories, and beliefs, in the direction it has chosen.¹⁸

If we compare these remarks of Augustine's about the will with Plato, or Aristotle, or the Stoics, we find no earlier parallels for this pervasive and explicit appeal to the will. We ought not to infer, however, that the earlier philosophers have no concept of the will. To see whether or not they have this concept, we ought to see whether the intellectualist and anti-intellectualist views that I described provide an accurate account of what Greek philosophers have to offer. If these views fail to do justice to Greek moral psychology, then it may be reasonable to attribute a concept of the will to Greek philosophers.

I will pursue this question with special reference to Aristotle. Though he does not necessarily provide the clearest evidence for the presence of a concept of the will in Greek philosophy, it is particularly instructive to consider him, for reasons that I will now explain.

2. Aquinas and Aristotle

St Thomas Aquinas's treatment of Aristotle holds a special place in the history of treatments of the will. For St Thomas clearly comes well after the discovery of the will, whenever that was; he unambiguously recognizes the will as a distinct faculty of the soul (*Summa Theologiae* 1a q80 a2; *De Veritate* q22 a3-4). His account of the will is influenced by Augustine, and by the Greek Christian writers Nemesius and John Damascene, who summarize a composite account of moral psychology derived from different sources in Greek philosophy.

Despite all this influence from the Greek and Latin Fathers, however, Aquinas takes himself to be expounding Aristotle's view. He regards Augustine's remarks about the will not as a description of something unknown to Aristotle, but as an elaboration of something that was already familiar to Aristotle. Augustine does not say what it is that could have all the functions that he ascribes to the will. Aquinas seeks to answer that question; in his view, Aristotle recognizes something that can do what Augustine says the will does, and therefore Aristotle has a concept of the will. It would be unfair to Aquinas if we were to assume that since we know Aristotle has no concept of the will, we know Aquinas must be wrong. We ought instead to see

why he believes that Aristotle's remarks apply to the will.

If Aquinas has a concept of the will, then we can try to answer our original question about whether Aristotle has a concept of the will, by answering a more precise question. If Aquinas interprets Aristotle correctly, then Aristotle has a concept of the will. If, on the other hand, we believe that Aristotle has no concept of the will, then we must show where Aquinas's interpretation of him is wrong.

In attributing a concept of the will to Aristotle, Aquinas makes two claims. First, he claims that Aristotle's concept of 'wish' (*boulêsis*) is really a concept of the will. Second, he claims that Aristotle's remarks about 'voluntary' (*hekousion*) action are about the role of the will. These are his general interpretative claims about Aristotle; but the Aristotelian passages he cites raise their own difficulties of exegesis, and it is not easy to decide for or against Aquinas. Aquinas's exegesis is careful and fair; he cannot be accused of simply forcing his general interpretation into his exegesis of individual passages. Indeed, I will sometimes suggest that Aquinas's exegesis is wrong, and that the right exegesis would actually support his general interpretation better than his own exegesis supports it. On the other hand I will not try to answer all the exegetical questions that would need to be answered if we were trying to vindicate Aquinas's general interpretation. I will simply argue that a reasonable case can be made for some of Aquinas's claims, and that he focusses on an important aspect of Aristotle's theory that receives too little attention from Aristotle himself. If this is true, then Aquinas is justified in his claim that Aristotle has a concept of the will.

3. Will as Rational Desire

Aquinas's term 'will' (*voluntas*) is the standard Latin translation of '*boulêsis*'.¹⁹ The translation is justified by the fact that 'velle' and 'voluntas' in Ciceronian Latin correspond fairly well in their non-technical uses to '*boulesthai*' and '*boulêsis*' in Greek. Aristotle's term is not his own invention; *boulêsis* is the sort of wanting, or wishing, or preferring, or aiming, that need not be an urgent desire resulting from some immediate felt need or passion.²⁰ 'Velle' and 'voluntas' capture this aspect of '*boulesthai*' and '*boulêsis*' quite well in Latin. It is a different question, however, whether Aristotle's remarks about *boulêsis* reveal a concept of the will that matches Aquinas's particular philosophical account of the will.

In Aquinas's view, 'will' is the name for essentially rational desire.²¹ It is 'a desire following the apprehension by the one who desires in accordance with free judgment. And of this sort is rational or intellectual desire, which is called the will' (*ST* 1-2 q26 a1). Aquinas appeals to the rational character of the will to contrast it with sensory desire, 'which follows apprehension by the one who desires, but from necessity, not from free judgment. And

of this sort is sensory desire in beasts; in human beings, however, it has some share in freedom, to the extent that it obeys reason' (1-2 q26 a1). Since human beings have essentially rational desires, they are not simply passive in relation to their desires; and so essentially rational desire gives us the reflective control that seems to be missing in accounts of choice that omit the will.

Aquinas believes that Aristotle also regards the will as essentially rational desire, realizing a capacity distinct from sensory desire (*De Ver* q22 a4). He recognizes that in Aristotle's list of the different types of capacities of the soul, desire is mentioned without distinction (*De Ver* q24 a4 obj 4), but he appeals none the less to Aristotle's division in *De Anima* iii (432b5) between *boulêsis* and the other desires (*in DA* §802-3; *ST* 1a q82 a1 obj 3; q87 a4; *De Ver* q22 a4 sc 1). Aquinas argues that the difference between the ways in which we grasp the objects of rational and non-rational desires makes it clear that Aristotle regards them as constituting different capacities (*ST* 1a q80 a2).

Some readers reject Aquinas's interpretation of Aristotle's tripartition of desire. While Aristotle sometimes distinguishes *boulêsis* from spirit and appetite, we might argue that this distinction does not imply recognition of an essentially rational form of desire. We might understand *boulêsis* as simply the desire that is not formed under the stimulus of some immediate pain, need, or provocation of the sort that produces the desires of *epithumia* and *thumos*.²² This sort of desire can be trained to conform to reason, since it can more easily be trained to focus on more remote objects and is less tied to immediate satisfactions. Still, it belongs, as the other desires do, to the desiring part, which is inherently non-rational, though it is capable of following reason (cf. *Nicomachean Ethics* 1102b13-1103a2).

If this is the right account of Aristotle's view of *boulêsis*, then Aquinas has gone wrong by imposing an inappropriately rationalist interpretation. The rationalist interpretation recognizes a sort of desire that is peculiar to the rational part of the soul and is distinct from non-rational desire. Aquinas, we might argue, commits an anachronism in claiming to find this rationalist view in Aristotle.²³ An 'anti-rationalist' view denies that the relation of different desires to reason constitutes an essential difference between them. Can we decide between these two views?

Aristotle describes *boulêsis* as rational desire aiming at the good (*Rhetoric* 1369a2-7), and he assumes that the only way we can be moved in accordance with reason is to be moved in accordance with *boulêsis* (*DA* 433a22-5). He even describes incontinence as the overcoming of *boulêsis* by non-rational desire (434a11-14).²⁴ What could Aristotle mean by claiming that all action in accordance with reason is action on *boulêsis*?

A difficulty for his claim arises from the role that he assigns to decision (*prohairesis*). For he distinguishes *prohairesis* from *boulêsis*, and claims that when we act on a specific rational desire for some achievable object here

and now we act on a *prohairesis*.²⁵ If *prohairesis* is to fit into the threefold classification of desire, it must count as *boulêsis*. In that case, we must not take Aristotle's division between *boulêsis* and *prohairesis* to imply that a *prohairesis* is not a *boulêsis*, in the sense of '*boulêsis*' that makes it coordinate with *thumos* and *epithumia*. When Aristotle compares *boulêsis* with *prohairesis*, he has already excluded the two non-rational forms of desire (1111b10-19); and when he says that *prohairesis* is not to be identified with *boulêsis*, he remarks that it none the less appears close to it (1111b19-20). The close connexion between *boulêsis* and *prohairesis* is emphasized in Aspasius' commentary:

Boulêsis appears close to *prohairesis*, since, first of all, it is in the rational part of the soul, where what most controls *prohairesis*²⁶ is, and, second, because it is a part of *prohairesis*. For whenever intellect after having deliberated approves and chooses, *boulêsis*, being a desire, goes forward with it. And in fact we are in the habit of treating *boulesthai* and *prohairesisthai* as signifying the same thing. For instead of saying 'I decide to farm my land' we say 'I wish (volo) to farm my land', and we say 'he has a good will (voluntas)', that is to say a good *prohairesis*.²⁷

Aristotle, then, acknowledges, indeed insists, that *prohairesis* and *boulêsis* are both desires belonging to the rational part.

If this is right, then Aristotle's remarks about the character of *prohairesis* may help us to see whether *boulêsis* is an essentially rational desire. If acting on *boulêsis* is simply acting on a desire that has been causally influenced by some sort of reasoning, then any action resulting from deliberation should be action on *boulêsis*. But Aristotle denies this. For he insists that a *prohairesis* cannot result simply from deliberation about the satisfaction of a non-rational desire; the deliberation of an incontinent person about how to satisfy his appetites does not produce a *prohairesis*, and hence does not arise from *boulêsis*.²⁸ Action on *boulêsis* must be rational in some sense that goes beyond simply acting on deliberation about a non-rational desire; and so a *boulêsis* must be rational in some sense that goes beyond simply being influenced by deliberation. Aristotle's claims about the connexion between *prohairesis* and *boulêsis* tend to support Aquinas's view that Aristotle recognizes an essentially rational form of desire; and so Aquinas is justified in supposing that Aristotle recognizes the will.

The case against Aquinas rests especially on an interpretation of *EN* i 13 and a claim about its connexion to *De Anima* iii 9. In this chapter of the *EN* Aristotle distinguishes a part of the soul that 'has reason fully and within itself' (1103a2) from a part that is 'non-rational, but shares in a way in reason' (1102b13-14). This second part is also called 'appetitive, and in general desiring' (*epithumêtikon kai holôs orektikon*, 1102b30). Two interpretations of this remark have been suggested. (1) According to the anti-rationalist interpre-

tation, Aristotle means to include all the desires mentioned in *De Anima* iii 9, including *boulêsis*, within the non-rational part; hence he recognizes no essentially rational desires.²⁹ (2) According to the rationalist interpretation, 'desiring' must indicate not that all desire is included in the non-rational part, but that the non-rational part is simply a desiring part (*haplôs orektikon*, as Aristotle might have put it), whereas the rational part is not simply a desiring part, but has distinctively rational desires. We need not, on this view, suppose that desire is confined to the non-rational part.³⁰ If the anti-rationalist interpretation of this chapter is correct, then Aristotle, at least sometimes, describes desire in terms that exclude any essentially rational desire of the sort that is required by Aquinas's conception of the will.

The anti-rationalist interpretation, however, cannot explain the argument of this chapter. For Aristotle takes incontinence as an example of conflict between the rational and the non-rational parts, remarking that in the incontinent person there is something that fights against and resists reason (1102b17-18). He sums this up by saying that 'the impulses (*hormai*) of incontinent people go in contrary directions' (1102b21).³¹ Now one of these contrary impulses belongs to the non-rational part that is capable of obeying reason but fails to obey reason in the incontinent person. But the other impulse cannot also belong to the non-rational part that is capable of obeying reason; it must belong to the part that is rational in its own right. In recognizing an impulse proper to the rational part, Aristotle seems to recognize essentially rational desire.³²

The difficulty of maintaining an anti-rationalist view of this chapter becomes especially clear if we consider Aquinas's own account of it; for, surprisingly, he accepts the anti-rationalist view, assuming that all desire belongs to the non-rational part that 'participates in a way in reason' (1102b13-14). Aquinas often appeals to this passage in support of his claim that the will is rational 'by participation' (*ST* 1-2 q56 a6 ad 2; q59 a4 ad 2; q61 a2c, ad 2; 2-2 q58 a4 ad 3). This claim is consistent with the claim that desires belonging to the will are essentially rational; in saying that the will is rational by participation Aquinas need only mean that it is rational in so far as it depends on rational beliefs and judgments, which are themselves rational in a more basic sense ('per essentiam', 1-2 q61 a2). Aquinas supposes that this conception of the will as rational by participation explains how Aristotle in *EN* i 13 could attribute all desire to the non-rational part.

This explanation, however, does not work. First Aquinas claims that 'the appetitive (concupiscibilis) power, and every desiring power, including the irascible power and the will, participate in some way in reason' (*in EN* §240). But at once he seems to contradict this claim. After remarking that the intellect is not subject to the actions of any bodily power, he says that the same is true of the will, 'which is in reason, as is said in *De Anima* iii' (§241). Having said this, however, he reverts to his first view, saying that one part of the

soul, including both sensory desire and the will, is non-rational in its own right, but rational by participation (§242). It is difficult to see how the will can both be in the rational part and be non-rational in its own right.

Aquinas's attempt to understand the non-rational part as including the will is especially difficult to reconcile with his account of Aristotle's remarks on incontinence. For he sees that Aristotle means to attribute a correct decision to the rational part of both the continent and the incontinent person, and that the non-rational part 'obstructs reason, that is to say, impedes it in carrying out its decision (electio = *prohairesis*)' (§237); the obstructing element is sensory desire. Now Aquinas recognizes that decision is an act of the will (§486; *ST* 1a q83 a3; 1-2 q13 a1), and so he must agree that the incontinent person's sensory desire obstructs his will. If this is true, then one of the conflicting parts of the soul must include the will and the other must include sensory desire; hence Aristotle must take the rational part to include the will, and therefore to include rational desires. Aquinas's account of Aristotle's remarks on incontinence is quite correct, and it fits the rationalist rather than the anti-rationalist interpretation; and so it shows why the anti-rationalist interpretation of the division between the rational and non-rational parts is wrong, and why Aquinas should not have accepted it.

We must reach the same conclusion if we try to reconcile this passage with Aristotle's other remarks about psychic conflict and the virtues. He remarks elsewhere that decision is contrary to appetite (*epithumia*), but appetite is not contrary to appetite (1111b15-16), and that incontinent people act on appetite, but not on decision (1111b13-14), even though they make the correct decision (1151b6-7). In the incontinent person, then, appetite conflicts with decision, which is a desire based on *boulêsis*. Now in i 13 Aristotle describes the conflict in the incontinent person as a conflict between the rational and the non-rational part. This description is inconsistent with his view that the conflict is between appetite and decision, unless he claims that some desire (i.e. *boulêsis*) belongs to the rational part. The rationalist view, then, gives a better account of this chapter in relation to Aristotle's other remarks.

Moreover, the anti-rationalist view forces on Aristotle a conception of *boulêsis* that raises far-reaching difficulties for his theory of virtue. For if the anti-rationalist view recognizes no essentially rational desires, it must explain what makes a desire into a *boulêsis*. It must apparently say that we come to form desires that are attached to objects that we believe to be good. First, (we might suppose) we pursue things that seem to offer pleasure or reward rather than pain or punishment, but gradually we are habituated to pursue things that seem to be good rather than bad. Such a desire, however, may still be non-rational. If we have been correctly trained, we will be pleased with the thought that an action is good and fine; in fact this is how the temperate or brave person's non-rational desires react to the appropriate information. But these non-rational reactions do not count, in Aristotle's view,

as expressions of *boulêsis* and *prohairesis*. For while he certainly agrees that we ought to form non-rational desires for things we believe to be good (1111a29-31), he does not suggest that every such desire is a *boulêsis*. The anti-rationalist view seems to oversimplify Aristotle's conception of the different sorts of desires that are present in a well-trained person.

The anti-rationalist view might be defended by appeal to the last part of *EN* i 13, where Aristotle uses his division of parts of the soul to mark the division between virtues of character and virtues of intellect (1103a3-10). The virtues of intellect clearly belong to the rational part, and do not essentially consist in well-ordered desires; well-ordered desires belong to the virtues of character. Does this not imply that all well-ordered desires, including those belonging to the will, belong to the non-rational part?³³

We ought not to draw this conclusion; for Aristotle neither says nor implies that the virtues of character belong exclusively to the non-rational part. He believes that none of them is exclusively a virtue of the rational part, since all of them essentially include some appropriate training of non-rational desires (those belonging to spirit and appetite). But to say this is quite consistent with saying that the virtues of character are also virtues of the rational part, in so far as they include the right decision. There is no reason to deny that Aristotle ascribes the rational desires characteristic of right decision to the rational part. And so this passage does not after all suggest that Aristotle assigns all desires to the non-rational part.

I have discussed *EN* i 13 because it may appear to suggest that Aristotle attributes all desire to the non-rational part, and hence recognizes no essentially rational desire. If this is his view, then the rationalist interpretation that identifies *boulêsis* with the will is open to severe objection. I have tried to show, however, that the rationalist interpretation is quite defensible as the best account of Aristotle's various remarks about desire and action. Aquinas provides us with a good argument for attributing a concept of the will to Aristotle.

4. Voluntary Action and the Will

If we agree with Aquinas so far, we will agree that Aristotle attributes to *boulêsis* the properties that belong to the will, and hence that 'voluntas' is a good translation of 'boulêsis'. It is a further question, however, whether Aquinas is right to claim that Aristotle regards the will as the source of 'voluntary' (*hekousion*)³⁴ actions, those that deserve praise and blame. If we disagree with Aquinas on this point, we need not reject his whole case for believing that Aristotle has a concept of the will; for the case rests primarily on Aquinas's view that *boulêsis* is essentially rational desire, and we have seen reasons for agreeing with that view. Still, it is worth seeing whether Aquinas is right in his claim about the role of the will in Aristotle's account

of voluntary action; for it is often supposed that we must recognize the will if we are to understand free and responsible agency, and it is worth asking whether Aristotle appeals to the will for this purpose.

Aquinas's account of Aristotle on the will seems to raise a special difficulty for his account of Aristotle on the voluntary. For in identifying *boulêsis* with the will, he assumes a strict conception of the will as essentially rational desire, and in claiming that voluntary action involves the will he assumes the same strict conception of the will. He must show, then that Aristotle regards voluntary action as the product of essentially rational desire. If we suppose that Aquinas is right about the nature of *boulêsis* in Aristotle, ought we also to agree with his view that voluntary action essentially involves *boulêsis*?

It would be easy to agree with Aquinas, if we found that Aristotle takes *prohairesis* to be necessary for voluntary action, for *prohairesis* requires *boulêsis*, and (in the sense explained above) actually counts as *boulêsis* in contrast to non-rational desires. Aristotle, however, seems to deny that *prohairesis* is necessary for voluntary action. He describes voluntary action as what is done neither by force nor because of ignorance, where the origin of the action is in the agent (*EN* 1111a22-4). This description seems to cover many actions that are not produced by deliberation and decision. Indeed Aristotle remarks that animals and children act voluntarily, because they act on their desires neither by force nor because of ignorance; and so voluntariness is not confined to rational agents (1111a24-6, b8-9).

Aquinas, however, applies his strict conception of the will to his account of Aristotle on voluntary action. He analyses a voluntary action as the product of the will (*ST* 1-2 qq 8-17), so that his account of all voluntary action includes deliberation and decision among the mental antecedents of action. He does not abandon or modify these conditions to allow animals to act voluntarily; instead he claims that they act voluntarily only to a lower degree (q6 a2). This claim about two degrees of voluntariness is not present in Aristotle.³⁵

Aquinas assumes that the voluntary is so called by reference to the will (*voluntas*) (q6 a2 obj 1), and so he infers that Aristotle takes voluntary action to involve the will. But this argument does not proceed as smoothly in Greek as it may seem to in Latin. For there is a clear apparent connexion in Aquinas's Latin between 'voluntarium' and 'voluntas', but there is no parallel connexion between '*hekousion*' and '*boulêsis*' in Aristotle's Greek; and so there is no reason to suppose that Aristotle must have assumed the connexion that leaps to Aquinas's eye. In fact Aristotle seems to take rational wish to be only one sort of desire that may initiate voluntary action.

Is Aquinas simply misled by Latin translations of Aristotle? This would not be a fair verdict on his claim that Aristotle's concept of *boulêsis* is a concept of the will; for Aquinas has good reasons for believing that the conventional translation conveys the right philosophical point. The same is true of his claims about the voluntary; he argues that Aristotle is committed to assuming some

connexion between voluntary action and the will.

First, Aquinas assumes that voluntary actions are the proper focus of praise and blame (q6 a2 obj 3). Aristotle agrees with this, since he thinks voluntariness is sufficient for being open to praise or blame. Aquinas claims, however, that 'praise and blame follow on a voluntary action that is in accordance with the complete form (perfecta ratio) of the voluntary, the sort that is not found in beasts' (q6 a2 ad 3). He infers that non-rational agents do not have the complete form of voluntary action, since they are not open to praise and blame, and that when Aristotle attributes voluntary action to these agents, he must intend only an incomplete form of voluntary action (q6 a2).

How much of this must Aristotle accept? He apparently agrees that the actions of non-rational agents are not open to praise and blame in the same way as the actions of rational agents are.³⁶ To avoid saying that their acting voluntarily makes them candidates for praise and blame, he must either deny that voluntary action is sufficient for praise and blame or agree with Aquinas's claim that non-rational agents lack the complete form of voluntary action that is necessary for praise and blame. Since he does not suggest that voluntariness is insufficient for praise and blame, he has good reason to accept Aquinas's interpretation of him.

Why, then, does the 'complete form of the voluntary' that is necessary for praise and blame involve the will? The complete form of the voluntary requires the complete knowledge of the end, in which 'not only does one grasp the thing that is the end, but one also grasps the character (ratio) of the end and how the thing directed to the end is related to the end' (q6 a2). If we have this grasp of the end and the means, we can deliberate about the means, and as a result of deliberation we can pursue or refrain from pursuing the end. In claiming that praise and blame require this complete knowledge of the end, Aquinas assumes that they require the deliberative choice that is characteristic of the will. This is the sort of choice that is necessary if we are to be in control (domini) of our actions (q6 a2 ad 2).

How far does Aristotle accept these connexions between the voluntary, control, and deliberation? He believes that actions we are praised or blamed for are 'up to us' (*eph'hêmin*), and does not suggest that anything further besides voluntariness is necessary if an action is to be up to us. Indeed he argues that an action is up to us if the origin is in us (1110a15-18);³⁷ and he supposes that when we do an action voluntarily, we are in control (*kurioi*) of that action (1113b30-1114a3).

What, then, constitutes our control over our actions? Aquinas believes we have control to the extent that we can deliberate about our actions: 'for from the fact that deliberating reason is related to contraries, the will is capable of going in both directions' (q6 a2 ad 2). Praise and blame are appropriate for agents who deliberate, because their capacity to deliberate gives them control over their actions, and so allows them to modify their actions in

response to praise and blame. Aquinas has a good reason, then, for claiming that the capacity for deliberation is an important condition for praise and blame, and therefore ought to be closely connected with voluntariness.

In marking this connexion between deliberation and control Aquinas follows Nemesius.³⁸ Aristotle says nothing so explicit; but he agrees in connecting deliberation with what is up to us (1112a30-1). He claims that it is reasonable to blame people who act wrongly because they are drunk and people who behave carelessly, even though they cannot help what they do when they are drunk and cannot help their careless behaviour. These people cannot plead that their inability to avoid what they did exempts them from blame; for, Aristotle insists, they were in control of not getting drunk and not becoming careless (1113b30-1114a7). Aristotle does not say that control consists in deliberative control; but it is reasonable to infer from the context that this is what he means.³⁹ For at the beginning of this discussion he refers back to his account of deliberation about means to ends, and of *boulêsis* for the end, and says that actions about means to ends are in accordance with decision and voluntary.⁴⁰ He infers that since the activities of the virtues are about means to ends, virtue and vice are up to us (1113b3-7). Here he answers in advance the question that arises later about why we are in control of not getting drunk or not being careless; he implies that it is because we can deliberate about the actions leading to these results. It is therefore difficult for Aristotle to resist Aquinas's claim that voluntary action requires deliberation and decision.

On the other hand, Aquinas's view does not seem to be Aristotle's unambiguous position. Both Aristotle and Aquinas believe that having the origin of *x* in me, having *x* up to me, doing *x* voluntarily, and being in control of *x* all seem to imply each other. But since Aristotle also believes that non-rational animals act voluntarily, he should infer that their actions are up to them; and elsewhere he suggests they this is indeed his view (*Phys.* 255a5-10). In that case they should also be in control of their actions; but Aquinas denies this. His denial does not contradict anything Aristotle actually says; for Aristotle never actually says that non-rational animals are in control of their actions. Still, Aquinas's view seems to conflict with the implications of Aristotle's remarks about the connexion between control and the other concepts used to describe voluntary action.

We have some reason to revise Aristotle's view in the direction taken by Aquinas, if we focus on the fact that Aristotle believes that control over our action is sufficient for being open to praise or blame for it. For he apparently ought to agree that if the source of our action were merely internal to us in the same way as it is internal to a non-rational animal, that would be insufficient for praise and blame; if it were sufficient for praise and blame, why would non-rational agents not be open to praise and blame?

Aristotle recognizes that there is no reason to blame people for actions

caused by defects that result from nature or illness or injury, since these defects are not up to the agents (1114a21-31). It is not clear how many defects are excluded by this test.⁴¹ But Aristotle ought to admit that some of the actions he means to exclude result from the agent's desires and not from external force, and so are no less voluntary than the actions of non-rational agents; actions resulting from insanity or sudden panic provide examples. If this degree of voluntariness is insufficient to warrant praise and blame, Aristotle ought to explain what further sort of control praiseworthy and blameworthy agents must have over their actions. He does not answer this question in general terms; but we have seen that when he defends his claim that virtue and vice are up to us, he appeals to the fact that the actions resulting in virtue and vice are open to deliberation. If we generalize this answer, Aristotle must say that praiseworthy and blameworthy agents have the relevant sort of control over their actions to the extent that they can deliberate about their actions. He must infer that non-rational animals lack this sort of control over their actions.

If Aristotle agrees with this, how ought he to modify his view about the connexions between control, being up to the agent, having the origin in the agent, and being voluntary? Aquinas suggests that non-rational agents act 'on their own initiative' (*sua sponte*) without being capable of the sort of voluntary action that depends on the will (*ST* 1-2 q6 a2; *in EN* §427; *De Ver* q24 a2 ad 1). Hence Aquinas apparently cannot believe that having an internal origin is sufficient for voluntary action. But Aristotle cannot reasonably believe this either. For the movements of plants and the purely nutritive movements of animals have an internal origin in so far as they are not the product of external force, but they are not voluntary movements. To argue that actions that have their origins in us are our voluntary actions, Aristotle must say that they have their origin properly in ourselves in so far as they have their origin in our will; these actions satisfy Aquinas's conditions for voluntariness.

Even if these are good reasons for agreeing with Aquinas's view that an Aristotelian account must regard the will as the source of voluntary action, there also seem to be good reasons for rejecting this view. Aristotle mentions 'sudden' actions as examples of voluntary actions that do not involve any decision (1111b9-10; see Aquinas, *in EN* §436; cf. Nemesius, *NH* 33.278); we just do them on the spur of the moment without any deliberation. Moreover, the incontinent person acts on appetite, but not on decision (*in EN* §439). This remark suggests, and Aristotle's account of incontinence explains further, that the incontinent acts voluntarily, but not on his decision. In these cases Aristotle clearly recognizes voluntary actions by rational agents, but insists that these actions are not products of decision. He does not explain why they are open to praise and blame, but he clearly assumes that they are.

It is important, then, for Aristotle to explain how we can be responsible for these actions that are not themselves the immediate product of a decision.

If he connects responsibility with the will, then he ought to be able to show how the will is engaged in these actions, even if they are not preceded by the most characteristic operations of the will. Aristotle does not take up this question directly, but Aquinas takes it up. His answer is too elaborate to be described fully here, but a few points will suggest the issues that it raises about Aristotle.

Aquinas recognizes a role for the will beyond actions produced by deliberation, by introducing some indirect effects of the will:

1. He remarks that we can be acting for the sake of an end without thinking about it all the time; 'for the power of the first aiming remains', even if we are not explicitly thinking about it (*ST* 1-2 q1 a6 ad 3).
2. He distinguishes directly voluntary from indirectly voluntary actions (q77 a7). A directly voluntary action is one towards which the will is moved; an indirectly voluntary action is one 'that the will was able to prohibit but does not prohibit'.
3. Voluntary action on passions requires the consent of the will (q15 a2; a4 ad 2), passions can influence the will in the direction of consenting (q9 a2; q77 a1). The incontinent person's will is engaged because he consents to the course of action favoured by his non-rational desires; hence he abandons his previous decision under the influence of passion.⁴²

More needs to be said to clarify Aquinas's account, and to see how well it might fit Aristotle. But the account is relevant to our general question, since it shows how an appeal to the will helps to explain how these actions are indeed, as Aristotle claims, voluntary actions for which the agent can reasonably be praised or blamed. Aristotle remarks that instead of holding pleasant or fine things responsible for our actions, we should regard ourselves as the causes, as being 'an easy prey' to such things (1110b13-14). Aquinas paraphrases:

...it is ridiculous...not to accuse oneself on the ground that one makes oneself an easy prey, that is to say, permits oneself to be overcome by pleasant objects of this sort. For our will is not moved of necessity by such objects of desire, but it is capable of attaching itself to them and of not attaching itself to them (*in EN* §403).

Aquinas takes the same view about Aristotle's claim that action on non-rational desires is voluntary (1111a29-31):

For no matter how much anger or appetite grows, a human being does not rush into action, unless the consent of rational desire is added. Further, the first claim seems inappropriate in the same way, namely someone's saying that goods that one ought to desire in accordance with passion as well [as rational desire] are not voluntary. For reason leads us through will to desire

those things that we ought to. (*in EN* §428)

In both cases Aquinas's paraphrase implies that Aristotle's argument is really about the will.

Aristotle says nothing here about the role that Aquinas ascribes to the will. But unless he assumes something like Aquinas's explanation, his defence of his position is unsatisfactory. The mere fact that a desire is internal to the agent in the same way as it is internal to a non-rational animal is not enough for the agent to be justly praised or blamed for it. But if agents are capable of affecting their desires or their influence on their actions, then Aristotle's claim is reasonable.

These arguments do not prove that Aquinas is right to rely on his conception of the will to explain voluntary actions that are not the direct product of rational deliberation; nor do they prove that Aquinas offers the best explanation of Aristotle's view, or the most Aristotelian account that might be offered to supplement Aristotle. Still, his account is worth mentioning, to forestall an obvious objection. It is easy to see that Aristotle does not mention *boulêsis* or *prohairesis* in all the places where Aquinas introduces the will; but Aquinas may still be right to believe that Aristotle needs to introduce the will in these places. If Aquinas is right on this point, he is right to claim that Aristotle explains voluntary action by appeal to the will.

While Aquinas at first seemed to be mistaken in intruding his own concept of the will into Aristotle's discussion of voluntary action, further examination shows that he actually explains Aristotle's intention more clearly than Aristotle explains it himself. For some of Aristotle's claims about voluntary actions are difficult to defend unless Aristotle relies on something like Aquinas's concept of the will. We would not be justified in attributing such a concept to Aristotle simply to defend his remarks about the voluntary, if we did not have some further reason for attributing it to him; but his views about *boulêsis* give us the further reason we need.

5. The Role of a Concept of the Will

If, as I have suggested, Aquinas can offer a reasonable defence of the genuinely Aristotelian character of his account of the will, he has also given us a good reason for supposing that Aristotle has a concept of the will. If we accept this conclusion, however, can we use the concept of the will that we have found in Aristotle to answer the questions that seem to require a reference to the will?

Aquinas believes that a conception of the will as essentially rational desire identifies the sort of thing that Augustine refers to; he believes that it is a third element in rational choice besides belief and mere desire. Aquinas believes that we are capable of rational choice between our dif-

ferent desires in so far as we are capable of deliberation about them in the light of our views of the overall good, and capable of choice in accordance with the result of this deliberation. Our belief that we are free agents, not passive spectators of our current desires, is explained, in his view, by our belief that we have wills, understood as capacities for rational desire. For this reason Aquinas believes that Aristotle has a concept of the will, because Aristotle's conception of *boulêsis* is a conception of the sort of rational desire that can properly be identified with the will.

We might agree with Aquinas's claim that Aristotle's conception of *boulêsis* matches his own conception of the will, but still deny that this is really an adequate conception of the will. For we may argue that the rational desire for the good is simply one of the desires between which the will has to choose, so that it cannot be identified with the will. According to this 'voluntarist' criticism of Aquinas, the will must be independent of beliefs about the good, and we must conclude that Aquinas stays too close to Greek intellectualism. A defender of Aquinas's position will reply that the voluntarist attempt to free the rational will from dependence on beliefs about the good really leaves no plausible conception of a rational will at all; for (it is argued) the voluntarist view leaves the will with no basis for a free and rational choice once it is severed from any appeal to the overall good.

This dispute between voluntarism and intellectualism is clearly relevant to discussion of Aquinas's attempt to find a concept of the will in Aristotle. Indeed, some critics who claim that Greek philosophers have no concept of the will may really mean that they do not hold a voluntarist conception of the will. It would be both a historical and a philosophical mistake, however, to claim that Greek philosophers lack a concept of the will, if we simply mean that they are not voluntarists. For the debate between voluntarism and intellectualism is a debate between two views of the will, among disputants who share a concept of the will.

If we allow ourselves, as we should, to be influenced by the history of discussion about the will, we see that we miss part of the point of this discussion if we refuse to recognize a concept of the will in Greek philosophers. One of the main issues in disputes about the will is about the plausibility of an intellectualist conception of the will, of the sort that Aquinas defends. We miss the significance of this issue if we refuse to attribute any concept of the will to Aquinas; but if we admit that Aquinas has a concept of the will, and if we attend to his account of Aristotle, we must also attribute a concept of the will to Aristotle.⁴³

Notes

- 1 W D. Ross, *Aristotle* (London: Methuen, 5th ed., 1949), p. 199. Ross does not entirely agree with this complaint, since he believes that Aristotle's doctrine

- of *prohairesis* is an attempt to formulate a conception of the will (though he does not think it is completely successful).
2. R.A. Gauthier and J.Y. Jolif, *Aristote: L'Éthique à Nicomaque* (Louvain. Publications Universitaires, 2nd ed., 4 vols., 1970), Commentary, p. 218.
 3. A.C. MacIntyre, *Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry* (Notre Dame Notre Dame UP, 1990), p. 111.
 4. See N.W. Gilbert, 'The concept of the will in early Latin philosophy', *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 1 (1963), pp. 17-35.
 5. This is MacIntyre's view. It is defended at length by A. Dihle, *The Theory of the Will in Classical Antiquity* (Berkeley U. of California Press, 1982). See also C.H. Kahn, 'Discovering the will', in *The Question of 'Eclecticism'*, ed. J.M. Dillon and A.A. Long (Berkeley U. of California Press, 1985), ch. 9.
 6. See Gauthier, Introduction, pp. 262-6.
 7. Dihle's failure to identify the relevant issues is justly remarked in C.A. Kirwan's review, *Classical Review* 34 (1984), pp. 335-6. Among the other writers I have mentioned, Gauthier describes the issues most clearly.
 8. This statement of the case is derived from Gauthier.
 9. This is an inadequate account of Plato (in the *Republic*) and Aristotle, some of its inadequacies will be suggested by my later remarks about Aristotle. But it captures one apparent aspect of their view that provides a contrast with Socrates.
 10. See *De Duab. Anim.* 14: Nobis autem voluntas nostra notissima est; neque enim scireme velle, si quid sit voluntas ipsa nescireme. Definitur itaque isto modo: voluntas est animi motus cogente nullo ad aliquid vel non amittendum vel adipiscendum.
 11. *De Lib. Arb.* iii 3: non enim quidquam tam firme atque intime sentio, quam me habere voluntatem, eaque me moveri ad aliquid fruendum, quid autem meum dicam prorsus non invenio, si voluntas qua volo et nolo non est mea, quapropter cui tribuendum est, si quid per illam male facio, nisi mihi? Cum enim bonus Deus me fecerit, nec bene aliquid faciam nisi per voluntatem, ad hoc potius datum esse a bono Deo, satis apparet. Motus autem quo huc aut illuc voluntas convertitur, nisi esset voluntarius, atque in nostra positus potestate, neque laudandus cum ad superiora, neque culpandus homo esset cum ad inferiora detorquet quasi quemdam cardinem voluntatis.
See also *Conf.* vii 5: liberum voluntatis arbitrium causam esse, ut male faceremus. Sublebat enim me in lucem tuam, quod tam sciebam me habere voluntatem quam me vivere. Itaque cum aliquid vellem aut nollem, non alium quam me velle ac nolle certissimus eram et ibi esse causam peccati mei iam iamque animadvertēbam.
 12. *Lib. Arb.* i 21: Nothing external can make a mind subject to sin: nulla res alia mentem cupiditatis comitem faciat, quam propria voluntas et liberum arbitrium. Cf. iii 2. [it is agreed that] nulla re fieri mentem servam libidinis, nisi propria voluntate.
 13. See *CD* xiv 6: Interest autem qualis sit voluntas hominis, quia si perversa est, perversos habebit hoc motus, si autem recta est, non solum inculpabiles, verum etiam laudabiles erunt. Voluntas est quippe in omnibus; immo omnes nihil aliud quam voluntates sunt. Nam quid est cupiditas et laetitia nisi voluntas in eorum consensione quae volumus? Et quid est metus atque tristitia nisi voluntas in dissensione ab his quae nolumus? Cf. xiv 9 the citizens of the city of God still have affections, et qua rectus est amor eorum, istas omnes adfectiones rectas habent.
 14. At *ST* 1-2 q55 a1 obj 2, Aquinas attributes Augustine's description of virtue as

'bonus usus liberi arbitrii' to *Lib. Arb.* ii. The words do not actually appear there, though they are a fair summary of ii 51. In fact they are Augustine's own summary in *Retrac* i 9.6: '... in mediis quidem bonis invenitur liberum voluntatis arbitrium, quia et male illo uti possumus, sed tamen tale est, ut sine illo recte vivere nequeamus. Bonus enim usus eius virtus est, qui in magnis reperitur bonis, quia male uti nullus potest.

15. On the relation of love to will see *Trin.* xv 41, describing the Holy Spirit: De spiritu autem sancto nihil in hoc aenigmate quod ei simile videretur ostendi nisi voluntatem nostram, vel amorem seu dilectionem quae valentior est voluntas, quoniam voluntas nostra quae nobis naturaliter inest sicut ei res adiacuerint vel occurrerint quibus allicimur aut offendimur ita varias affectiones habet.
16. *CD* xv 22: Unde mihi videtur, quod definitio brevis et vera virtutis ordo est amor Cf. xiv 7 Recta itaque voluntas est bonus amor et voluntas perversa malus amor
17. On the connexion of wills for means and ends see *Trin.* xi 10: Rectae enim sunt voluntates et omnes sibi met religatae si bona est illa quo cunctae referuntur, si autem prava est, pravae sunt omnes Et ideo rectarum voluntatum conexio iter est quoddam ascendentium ad beatitudinem quod certis velut passibus agitur, pravarum autem atque distortarum voluntatum implicatio vinculum est quo alligabitur qui hoc agit ut proiciatur in tenebras exteriores
18. On the will as applying other mental capacities to a situation see *Trin.* xi 15 Voluntas porro sicut adiungit sensum corpori, sic memoriam sensui, sic cogitantis aciem memoriae Quae autem conciliat ista atque coniungit, ipsa etiam disiungit et separat, id est voluntas.
19. For the translation see Cicero, *Tusculan Disputations*, iv 12, translating the Stoic term in (e.g.) Diogenes Laertius, vii 116 The mss. here read 'nos appellamus voluntatem', suggesting that Cicero is drawing attention to an established usage of 'voluntas' rather than coining or adapting (as he often does) a term in a special Stoic sense R.M. Henry (in T.W. Dougan and R.M. Henry (edd.), *Tusculan Disputations*, vol. 2 [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1934], ad loc.) prefers the emendation 'appellemus' on grounds that strike me as doubtful The fact that Cicero regularly uses the subjunctive for coinages and adaptations does not imply that he should use the subjunctive in this passage, for it is open to dispute whether he is announcing a coinage or simply describing ordinary usage
20. Hence 'wish' is perhaps the least unsatisfactory uniform translation of '*boulêsis*' in Aristotle. Normally, however, I will leave the term untranslated
21. Voluntas nominat rationalem appetitum, *ST* 1-2 q6 a2 ad 1. Cf. 1a q81 a1, 87 4, 1-2, q6 intro, q8 a1. I use 'desire' for 'appetitus', since Aquinas uses 'appetitus' to translate '*orexis*' This can easily cause confusion, since one way of characterizing will distinguishes it from desire. But 'appetite' seems even less suitable, except on etymological grounds. I use 'appetite' to translate '*epithumia*' (for which Aquinas uses 'concupiscentia')
22. This might be the point of describing *boulêsis* as a 'desire without pain' (*Topics* 146a36-b6), Aristotle does not, however, accept this description as an adequate definition of *boulêsis*. The same conception of *boulêsis* may explain why Aristotle in one passage allows children to have *boulêsis*, as well as other forms of desire, before they acquire reason (*Politics* 1334b17-25)
23. As Gauthier puts it (Commentary, pp. 193-4), 'For the scholastics, the will is precisely a rational desire, in the sense that it is an activity of the rational soul, which possesses in itself a desiring faculty distinct from the irrational desiring faculty—an idea totally foreign to Aristotle' In Gauthier's view, Aristotle consistently treats *boulêsis* as a movement of the desiring part of the soul, and

- hence of a non-rational part, which becomes rational, 'in obeying the voice of reason, allowing itself to be moulded by the rule pronounced by reason'. Gauthier finds support in Alexander, *De Anima*, 74.6-13
24. 434a11-14 is a notoriously difficult passage. I think Ross (in his Oxford Classical Text [Oxford Clarendon Press, 1956]) goes too far, however, in accepting an emendation that omits *tên boulêsin* altogether. Though it is missing in three mss., it is not an obvious gloss, since *boulêsis* has not been mentioned in the immediate context. Moerbeke translates as though he had read *bouleusin* instead of *boulêsin*, and Aquinas assumes this in his commentary, §843. If he had found a reference to *boulêsis*, and hence to voluntas, he might have had some difficulty in explaining how an agent's voluntas could be overcome in incontinent action
 25. Hence some are inclined to identify the will with *prohairesis* rather than with *boulêsis*. See Ross, *Aristotle*, p. 200, J. Burnet, *The Ethics of Aristotle* (London Methuen, 1900) p. 109; G. Rodier, *Aristote. Traité de l'âme* (Paris. Leroux, 1900), p. 532.
 26. Or 'the most important part of *prohairesis*' (*to kuriôtaton tês prohaireseôs*)
 27. *Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca* vol. 19, ed. C. G. Heylbut (Berlin. Reimer, 1889), 68.27-32. Unfortunately the Greek has a lacuna in the last sentence. The translation of the sentence is based (see Heylbut's app. crit.) on Felicianus' Latin translation, which uses 'velle' and 'voluntas' where the Greek presumably has 'boulesthai' and 'boulêsis'
 28. See 1113a12. I incline, following Gauthier, to read *kata tên boulêsin*, as the lectio difficilior. DA 434a12 is another place where an original ms. reading *boulêsin* may have been corrupted into *bouleusin*. For the relation of *prohairesis* to *boulêsis* see also 1113b3-5, and on the deliberation of the incontinent person see 1142b17-20
 29. This view about the broad scope of *holôs orektikon* is accepted by J. A. Stewart, *Notes on Aristotle's Ethics* (Oxford Clarendon Press, 1892), ad loc., and by Burnet, *Aristotle's Ethics*. Curiously, it is rejected by Gauthier, even though he accepts the anti-rationalist line that requires the broad scope; he takes Aristotle to be alluding only to *thumos* as well as *epithumia*, not to *boulêsis* as well (though he gives no reason for his view)
 30. Some of the Greek commentators show that they take the non-rational part to consist only of *epithumia* and *thumos*. See Heliodorus, *Commentaria*, vol. 19, 24.20; Aspasius, 35.22, 36.2 (*to orektikon kai pathêtikon*), Eustratius, *Commentaria*, vol. 20, 118.33-5. They do not discuss the role of *boulêsis*. It is mentioned, however in Eustratius, 116.11-12: *houtô kai epi tês psuchês epi ta beltîô tou logou tas alogous dunameis kinein boulomenou*.
 31. An alternative translation is 'the impulses of incontinent people go in directions contrary [to the instructions of the rational part]'. This is the view of (apparently) Aquinas (§237), Burnet, and F. Dirlmeier, *Aristoteles' Nikomachische Ethik* (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1969). Stewart's view is not clear. I follow the interpretation of Gauthier (who again fails to recognize the damage it apparently does to his anti-rationalist view). His view, taking 'contrary' to mean 'contrary to each other' rather than 'contrary to the instruction of the rational part', fits better with the immediately preceding illustration of the movements of partly paralysed bodies, and makes better sense of the plural in *hormai*.
 32. Gauthier argues that the use of '*hormê*' belongs to a stage of Aristotle's thought at which he did not yet use '*orexis*' as a generic term for all desire, but confined it to non-rational desire. I doubt whether Gauthier is right to rely on a chronological hypothesis here, but if he is right to claim that '*hormê*' is the generic term for

desire, of which 'orektikon' indicates two of the three species, the passage actually seems to be good evidence for the rationalist view that Gauthier rejects. (Gauthier's reference to *boulêsis* at the top of p. 96 shows how the rationalist view might be defended.)

33. This seems to be the view of Aquinas, in *EN* §243.
34. I use 'voluntary' to translate '*hekousion*', without meaning to beg any question in favour of Aquinas's view.
35. This claim about a lower degree of voluntariness also applies to children. But it needs to be modified, as Aquinas realizes, to account for the gradual acquisition of reason, and hence of free choice, in children. See 1a q99 a1; q101 a2; 3a q80 a9 ad 3.
36. In *EN* iii 1-5 Aristotle does not explicitly deny that non-rational animals are open to praise and blame. But none of his remarks about praise and blame suggest that he has animals in mind as appropriate candidates. All his remarks suggest that praise and blame mark the agent's degree of virtue or vice; indeed, the voluntary and involuntary are mentioned because they are relevant to praise and blame, which is relevant to virtue (1109b30-5). The virtues of character and intellect are introduced as praiseworthy states (1103a8-10), and Aristotle suggests that when we praise a person for good actions we are actually praising his virtue (1101b12-18, 31-4). In *EN* vii Aristotle insists that animals are incapable of virtue or vice (1149b30-1150a1) or incontinence (1147b3-5); and in his ethical works he never suggests that agents incapable of these conditions could be open to praise or blame. Similarly, his account of praise in *Rhetoric* i 9 is about praise of the virtues of rational agents. He mentions the possibility of some sort of praise of 'things without souls and any at all of the other animals' (*Rhet.* 1366a30), but he clearly distinguishes this from the sort of praise that is appropriate for virtue. (For examples of the other sorts of praise alluded to here see E.M. Cope, *Aristotle's Rhetoric* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1877], ad loc.) If we sought to describe a reduced sense of 'praise' in which it would be appropriate for animals, it would be reasonable to appeal to something like Aquinas's notion of a lower degree of voluntariness.
37. Since Moerbeke translates '*eph' hêmin*' by 'in nobis', Aquinas does not notice that a move from 'the origin of x is *en hêmin*' to 'x is *eph' hêmin*' is as non-trivial as it seems to be in Aristotle. But if Aquinas had noticed this, he would have had another argument for the line of interpretation he favours. In fact his paraphrase brings out Aristotle's claim better than Moerbeke's translation does: *Ea autem quae fiunt ex principio intrinseco sunt in potestate hominis ut ea operetur vel non operetur, quod pertinet ad rationem voluntarii* (§391).
 In saying that Aristotle takes x's having its origin in me to imply x's being up to me, I am speaking only of the *EN*. I think the claim is defensible for the *EE* too; but the question is more complicated.
38. See Nemesius, *De Natura Hominis*, ed. M. Morani (Leipzig: Teubner, 1987), 325-6 = p.117.23-118.1.
39. Aquinas quite reasonably takes Aristotle to be considering control exercised by the will (§508).
40. Aquinas takes Aristotle to mean that the activities of the virtues are voluntary *because* they are in accordance with decision. ('...sint secundum electionem, et per consequens sint voluntaria. Quia electio voluntarium est, ut supra dictum est', §496.)
41. In *EN* vii 5 Aristotle lists 'bestial' pleasures that appeal not only to people with diseased natures, but also to those who have suffered from 'morbid' conditions

that result from bad habits. He regards all these conditions as outside the area of virtue and vice (1148b15-1149a1). Though it is sometimes up to us to prevent ourselves from acting on these morbid impulses, Aristotle does not suggest that it is up to us to acquire them; but he could not reasonably deny that our desires play a crucial role in our acquiring the impulses.

42. See 1-2 q6 a7 ad 2-3; q6 a8; q77 a2; 2-2 q155 a3; q156 a1.
43. I have benefited from comments on a version of this paper read at the Institute for Classical Studies, London, and especially from remarks by Richard Sorabji, Myles Burnyeat, Norman Kretzmann, and Gail Fine.